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This thesis investigates how access control can be implemented in applications which
utilize Linked Data. From the viewpoint of access control the relevant subject is,
instead of Linked Open Data, specifically Linked Closed Data.
The research question was scrutinised by implementing with Java programming
language a module, called AccessController, with which applications can retrieve
data from servers regardless if the data is open or closed. The module also manages
credentials of the end-user by storing the credentials as encrypted in a file.
For closed data protected with OAuth 2.0, the module offers an option to grant
access tokens for an untrusted third-party application. With access tokens the un-
trusted can retrieve data owned by the granter.
The module was also used as a library when implementing a Apache Ant task.
In an Ant pipeline the task has the same features as the module has in a Java
application.
The AccessController module meets its requirements well. However, the most
significant weakness is that the expiring time of access tokens cannot be controlled.
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Tämä diplomityö tutkii, kuinka voidaan toteuttaa pääsynhallinta sovelluksissa, jotka
hyödyntävät linkitettyä dataa (Linked Data). Pääsynhallinnan kannalta oleellista
on nimenomaan linkitetty suljettu data (Linked Closed Data) linkitetyn avoimen
datan (Linked Open Data) sijasta.
Tutkimuskysymystä selvitettiin toteuttamalla Java-ohjelmointikielellä moduuli,
AccessController, jonka avulla sovellukset voivat hakea dataa palvelimilta riippumatta
siitä onko data avointa vai suljettua. Moduuli myös hallinnoi loppukäyttäjän kir-
jautumistietoja säilyttämällä niitä kryptattuna tiedostossa.
OAuth 2.0:lla suojatulle suljetulle datalle moduuli tarjoaa mahdollisuuden myön-
tää ei-luotetulle kolmannelle osapuolella ns. access token’eita, joilla ei-luotettu ap-
plikaatio voi hakea myöntäjän omistamaa dataa.
Moduulia käytettiin myös kirjastona toteutettaessa Apache Ant task’ia. To-
teutetulla task’lla voi Ant putkilinjassa tehdä samat toiminnot kuin käytettäessä
moduulia Java-applikaatiossa.
AccessController-moduuli täyttää sille osoitetut vaatimukset hyvin. Suurimpana
puutteena mainittakoon kuitenkin se, ettei access token’eiden vanhentumisaikaa voi
hallita.
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11. INTRODUCTION
There are already available XML pipeline tools, e.g. Apache Ant and XProc, which
can retrieve Linked Open Data. Also many programming languages, such as Java or
Python, have class with which it is possible to retrieve open online data. However,
these tools and languages lack of feature of retrieving Linked Closed Data. Therefore,
this thesis tries to find a solution for Linked Closed Data retrieval in applications.
The writing of the thesis started in September 2012. The topic was suggested by
the examiner of thesis, adjunct professor Ossi Nykänen.
1.1 Research question
As its main research question, this thesis investigates ‘’How to implement with
Java programming language an application that retrieves linked data from resource
servers protected with different authorization techniques and stores credentials for
the resource servers in a keyring file”. Actually, the thesis aims to implement a
package, or a module, which can handle the access granting for different resource
servers. The module is called AccessController.
The thesis also intends to find the answers to the following issues:
1. Can the access controlling package be used as an independent external module?
2. How do the authentications with OAuth 2.0 and HTTP Basic Authentication
work together?
3. Can accesses to resource servers be revoked?
4. Can AccessController module manage any kind of credentials?
5. Is AccessController module usable?
For testing the functionality of the module, an application called Soil Sample
Mapper was designed. Furthermore, AccessController’s feature of granting access
tokens was tested by creating two simple applications: an application which acts as
the owner of the resources and grants the tokens, and an untrusted application which
uses the granted tokens. For proving AccessController’s suitability as an external
module, an Apache Ant task was also implemented.
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1.2 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is structured as follows. The second chapter depicts technologies associ-
ated to the AccessController module. Chapter 3 is a selection of studies related to
the subject of this thesis. Chapter 4 presents the evaluation framework for Access-
Controller and lists the evaluation criteria. In chapter 5 the methods, class structure
and exceptions of AccessController are presented. Chapter 6 describes the case stud-
ies developed for testing the functionality of AccessController: the chapter covers
Soil Sample Mapper, the untrusted application and the Apache Ant task. Chapter 7
states the methods and the results of the thesis. The last chapter, chapter 8, draws
the conclusions.
32. TECHNOLOGIES
This chapter deals with technologies related to the AccessController module. The
AccessController module is designed for retrieving both Linked Open Data and
Linked Closed Data and it provides features for obtaining closed data from resource
servers protected with OAuth 2.0 or HTTP Basic Authentication.
2.1 Linked Data
Linked Data is machine-readable and explicitly defined data published on the Web.
Linked Data is linked to other external data sets and can be linked to from external
data sets. [3]
A set of rules, the ’Linked Data principles’, describes how data published on the
Web becomes a part of a single global data space [3]:
• Use URIs as names for things
• Use HTTP URIs so that people can look up those names
• When someone looks up a URI, provide useful information, using the standards
(RDF, SPARQL)
• Include links to other URIs, so that they can discover more things
These rules are actually expectations of behaviour. Hence, breaking them does
destroy data, but misses an opportunity to interconnect the data. The lack of
interconnection of data reduces possibilities to reuse data in unexpected ways. And
it is expressly the unexpected re-use of information which is the value added by the
Web. [1]
Linked Data is divided into two types by whether the data has access or legal
restrictions or not. These two types are Linked Open Data which does not has
any restrictions (LOD), and Linked Closed Data (LCD) which has access or legal
restrictions. Two following to sections detail LOD and LCD.
2.1.1 Linked Open Data
Berners-Lee states that Linked Open Data is Linked Data which is released under
an open licence, which does not impede its reuse for free [1]. The following star
scheme defines the quality of LOD [1]:
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• 1 star: Available on the web but with an open licence, to be Open Data
• 2 stars: Available as machine-readable structured data
• 3 stars: In addition to the previous qualifications, available in non-proprietary
format
• 4 stars: In addition to the previous qualifications, uses open standars from
W3C (RDF and SPARQL) to identify things for making the data linkable
• 5 stars: In addition to the previous qualifications, is linked to data of publishers
to provide context
Linked Data does not have to generally be open and it possible to have 5-star
Linked Data without it being open. However, if the data claims to be Linked Open
Data then it has to be open to get any star at all. [1]
2.1.2 Linked Closed Data
Linked Closed Data is Linked Data for which access to or use to is restricted tech-
nically or legally. The restrictions of Linked Data vary with the access restrictions
(who is permitted to ’see’ data) and the license (what is permitted to do with the
data). The access can be restricted only by the resources of the dataset host; re-
stricted, open to users who meet specific access criteria; or private, open only to its
owner.
Dataset licenses may waive all intellectual property rights; impose, for example,
attribution or copyleft; or specify permitted uses of a dataset. Usually, a restrictive
license goes along with an access restriction because otherwise license breaches would
be difficult to detect and punish. [5]
2.2 OAuth 2.0
The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain
limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orches-
trating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service,
or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. [10]
In OAuth, the client requests access to resources controlled by the resource owner
and hosted by the resource server, and is issued a different set of credentials than
those of the resource owner. [10]
Instead of using the resource owner’s credentials to access protected resources, the
client obtains an access token - a string denoting a specific scope, lifetime, and other
access attributes. Access tokens are issued to third-party clients by an authorization
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server with the approval of the resource owner. The client uses the access token to
access the protected resources hosted by the resource server. [10]
2.2.1 Obtaining an access token
Figure 2.1 shows the abstract OAuth 2.0 flow, which describes the interaction in
authorization. In step A the client requests authorization directly from the resource
owner or indirectly via the authorization server as an intermediary. In step B the
client receives an authorization grant which represents the resource owner’s autho-
rizaton. The client requests an access token by presenting the authorization grant in
step C. In step D the authorization server authenticates the client and validates the
authorization grant. If the authorization grant is valid the server issues an access
token. In step E the client requests the protected resource from the resource server
and authenticates by presenting the access token. If the access token is valid the
the resource server serves the requested resource in step F. [10]
The methods used by the resource server to validate the access token are beyond
the scope of OAuth 2.0 specification. However, the methods involve an interaction
or coordination between the resource server and the authorization server. [10]
Figure 2.1: Obtaining an access token
Listing 2.1 shows a successful HTTP response of an access token request. The
response is a JSON document including required, recommended and optional param-
eters. The required paremeters are access_token and token_type. The parameter
expires_in, which states the lifetime in seconds of the access token, is the recom-
mended parameter. Refresh_token is an optional parameter. Scope is an optional
parameter if its value is identical to the scope requested by the client, otherwise it
is a required parameter. [10]
HTTP /1.1 200 OK
Content -Type: application/json;charset=UTF -8
Cache -Control: no -store
Pragma: no -cache
{
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"access_token ":"2 YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type ":" example",
"expires_in ":3600 ,
"refresh_token ":" tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
"example_parameter ":" example_value"
}
Listing 2.1: Succesful response to an access token request
Typical lifetime of an access token is an hour. However, the lifetime is not
guaranteed and the server may postpone the expiration time. [7]
2.2.2 Refreshing an expired access token
The flow of obtaining a new access token by using a refresh token is described in
figure 2.2. In step A the client request an access token from an authorization server
and in step B the server issues an access token and refresh token if the authorization
grant was valid. In step C the client requests a protected resource from the resource
server and if the access is valid the resource server serves the request. Steps C and
D repeat until the access token expires and the resource server returns an invalid
token error. If the client knows the access token expired it skips to step G where the
client requests a new access token by authenticating with the authorization server
and presenting the refresh token. In step H the authorization server authenticates
the client the client and validates the refresh token. If the refresh token was valid
the server issues a new access token and optionally a new refresh token. [10]
Figure 2.2: Refreshing an expired access token.
A refresh token is a credential used to obtain an extra access token when the
current access token becomes invalid or expires. A refresh token is typically a long-
lasting credential and therefore bound to the client it was issued. If the client type is
confidential or the client was issued client credentials, the client must authenticate
with the authorization server. [10]
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2.2.3 Authorization grant
An authorization grant is a credential representing the resource owner’s authoriza-
tion used by the client application to obtain an access token. The specification of
OAuth 2.0 defines four types of an authorization grant; authorization code, implicit
grant, client credential grant and resource owner password credentials. [10]
The authorization code is obtained by using an authorization server as an inter-
mediary between the client and resource owner. The implicit grant type does not
issue intermediate credentials (e.g. an authorization code). In the implicit flow the
client is issued an access token directly. The resource owner password credentials
(i.e. username and password) can be used directly as an authorization grant to
obtain an access token. This grant type should be used only if there is a high degree
of trust between the resource owner and the client. The client credentials grant can
be used when the authorization scope is limited to the protected resources under
the control of the client. [10]
The grant type used by AccessController is an authorization code. Figure 2.3
illustrates the flow of obtaining an access token by the authorization code grant type.
In step A the client directs the resource owner’s user-agent to the authorization
endpoint. In step B the authorization server authenticates the resource owner.
If the owner grants access the authorization server redirects the user-agent back
to the client using the redirection URI provided earlier (step C). The redirection
URI includes an authorization code. In steps D and E the client exchanges the
authorization code for an access token (described in section 2.2.1). [10]
Figure 2.3: Obtaining an access token with authorization code grant.
The client constructs the authorization request URI by adding the following pa-
rameters to the query component of the authorization endpoint URI. The required
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parameters of the URI are response_type and client_id which is the client identi-
fier. When using authorization code grant the value of response_type must be set
to ”code”. Parameters redirect_uri and scope are optional. Parameter state, which
is an opaque value used by the client to maintain state between the request and
callback, is a recommended parameter. [10]
2.2.4 Token revocation
An authorization server can support the revocation of tokens by providing a token
revocation endpoint. A compliant endpoint must be able to revoke refresh tokens
but access token revocation may be also supported. [11]
Since token revocation requests are plain text credentials in a HTTP request, the
authorization server must support TLS 1.0 or its future replacements. The token
parameter is the only requested parameter of the client’s HTTP request which also
includes the authentication credentials of the client. [11]
The authorization server first validates the client credentials (if present) and
verifies whether the client is authorized to revoke the particular token. Next the
authorization server invalidates the token. If the token is a refresh token and the
server can revoke access tokens, then the the server should also invalidate all access
tokens issued for that refresh token. The authorization server indicates a succesful
revocation by a HTTP status code 200, a failed client authentication by a code 401,
unauthorized client for revoking the token by a code 403, and all the other error
conditions by a code 400. [11]
The authorization server or a related entity may also offer its end-users a self-
care portal for deleting access given to third-party client applications. Such a portal
offers the possibility to an end-user to look at and revoke all access grants the user
once authorized. [11]
2.3 HTTP Basic Authentication
The basic authentication scheme of HTTP protocol is based on the model that the
user agent must authenticate itself with a user-ID and a password for each realm.
The scheme assumes that the connection between the client and server is trusted
and therefore it is a non-secure method. [2]
To receive an authorization the client base64 encodes the user-ID and password
separated by a single colon (":") character and sends the result string of the encoding
in credentials. [2]
93. RELATED APPLICATIONS AND STUDIES
This chapter presents applications relevant to the theme of this theses. The selected
surveys scrutinise on applications in which the end-users login into a SSO system.
3.1 Security of SSO mechanisms
The security of the deployed single sign-on mechanisms was investigated by Wang et
al. The methodology in the research was the following. The researches were not able
to observe the messages between the identity provider (e.g. Facebook) and relying
parties. Hence, an automated black-box test was made on the HTTP messages
which the web browser passes between the relying party and the identity provider.
These messages are called browser relayed messages (BRM). [16]
The most important result of the research was that there are security-critical
logic flaws in SSO systems. For example, a malicious application could act as an
identity provider, relying party or browser and in this way steal the user’s credentials.
However, these flaws can be discovered from BRMs without even access to source
code or other insider knowledge of the systems. [16]
3.2 Challenges and concerns which web users face when using
OpenID for authentication
Sun et al. researched the challenges and concerns web users face when using a SSO
solution called OpenID for authentication. They intended to find answers to the
following research questions [15]:
1. What are a web user’s perceptions, challenges, concerns and perceived benefits
when using OpenID?
2. How do the the OpenId login user interface and workflow impact users’ mental
models?
3. What factors influence users’ adoption intentions?
4. What changes in the login process could improve users’ experience and adop-
tion incentives?
3. Related applications and studies 10
The researchers made an in-lab exploratory study for understanding these re-
quirements. In the study a phishing resistant, privacy-preserving browser add-on
was designed. [15]
The researchers found, for example, the following concerns and misconceptions:
no perceived urgent need for Web SSO, single-point of failure and and security
misconceptions of which one example is that the mojority of participants thought
that they were giving their usename and password to the relying parties directly.
Additionally, the participants were concerned about phishing attacks to identity
providers, privacy and trustworthy of relying parties, and they had also account
linking misconceptions. [15]
As a results the researchers perceived that users value the concept of SSO but
require a usable, secure and privacy-preserving experience. Therefore, many users
would use a Web SSO solution only on relying-party websites that are familiar and
trustworthy. [15]
3.3 Resistance of browser-based OAuth authorization
Richardson designed launchpadlib library which presents Launchpad website as a
densely interconnected network of Python objects. The launchpadlib application
uses OAuth for authorizing users to Launchpad website. The site hosts colloborative
deveplopment for the Ubuntu Linux distribution, many of Ubuntu’s component
packages, and many unrelated open source software projects. It protects its resources
with OAuth authentication. [14]
The launcpadlib application opens a web page on the address www.launcpad.net
in the end-user’s web browser. The web page explains that the application wants to
access to the end-user’s Launchpad account. The end-user either denies the access
or grants a limited or full access. If the end-user grants an access the access token
is authorized and launchpadlib can use Launchpad on the end-user’s behalf. [14]
According to the paper the best way to distinguish between legimate delegation of
authority and a fishing attempt is to handle the authentication from the end-user’s
web browser because it is a trusted client: the user trusts it with passwords and the
user trust its address bar. [14]
However, some developers did not like the authentication system of launcpadlib.
Hence, they wrote hacks which simulated the browser-based authorization protocol
by asking an username and password. From an architectural standpoint these hacks
were spyware. [14]
A compromise in the authentication system was made: it is possible to authorize
an OAuth access token without opening the end-user’s web browser. In this solution
the authorization is made by pinentry which is a suite of small programs for reading
passphrases and PIN numbers in a secure manner. [14]
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3.4 Gaining access to organisational resources in a secure way
with login accounts of social networks
Chadwick et al. designed a federated identity management service that allows users
to access organisational resources using their existing login accounts in social net-
working (SN) sites, without compromising the security of the organisation’s re-
sources. [4]
In the service users link together their various accounts (organisational and ex-
ternal). The strongest registration procedure of of one linked account is leveraged
by the other site’s login processes. [4]
According to the paper the major problem in using social networks for SSO is that
there is no authentication of their users’ identities at the time of registration. This
means that the physical identity and virtual identity are not binded together. [4]
A trusted service provider (TSP) manages the account linking procedure. The
TSP remembers the set of account that the user has linked together. The TSP has
to be trusted by the service providers and users. The trust is achieved when the
TSP is part of the service provider’s domain and managed by the service provider
itself. [4]
To define the security of authentication the researches determined the lowest level
of assurance. The components of the lowest level of assurance are the following; the
protocol that is used to communicate the authentication assertion between the iden-
tity provider and service provider; the authentication mechanism and tokens that
are used to authenticate the user by the identity provider; and the authentication
procedure used by the identity provider during user enrollment and registration. [4]
The service achieved its initial objectives and allows external users access univer-
sity resources using their existing external login accounts, without having to first
register a new account at the university. Furthermore, students are able to link their
external and university accounts together. [4]
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4. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
This chapter presents the evalution framework for evaluating the AccessController
module. The last section of the chapter lists the evaluation criteria.
4.1 SSO framework features
There are two different scenarios which can be supported by a SSO framework like
AccessController; login first and application first. In the login first scenario the user
first performs login to a SSO infrastructure and then chooses a service to access.
In the application first scenario the user first tries to access a service but because
the user has not been authenticated yet, the service redirects the user to the login
service and after a successful logon the user is redirected back to the service. [12]
SSO framework should provide a logout service, rather a single sign-off service in
which a single action of signing out revokes access to multiple servers. [12]
An important security requirement for SSO frameworks is a secured interaction
between the client and the authorization server or resource server. The secured
interaction can be achieved, for example, with TSL or SSL protocol. [12]
4.2 Password manager features
Some features of password managers can be compared to features of AccessCon-
troller. Password managers can be web browser’s built-in password stores, or web-
based or local (desktop) applications.
In order to access credentials a secure password manager requires a masterpass-
word which only the user knows. The encrypted masterpassword is stored in local
file system in desktop applications and online (e.g. in a cloud) in web-based appli-
cations. Some password managers provide an option to use a key file instead of a
master password or combine the key file and password methods.
For extra security multi-factor authentication, for example a master password and
one time passwords, can be used. Because web-based applications can be accessed
from any device they have better accessibility than desktop applications. On the
other hand, in desktop applications the user has control over where the data is
stored. Users do not have that control in web-based password managers. [13]
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4.3 Other features
Some SSO frameworks has centralized management which includes, for example, user
provisioning, profile management, trust configuration and usage monitoring. [9]
Considering tokens of OAuth 2.0 there are some desirable features for AccessCon-
troller. The scopes and expiring times of tokens should be possible to change after
obtaining the tokens from the authorization server. For security reasons also the
scope of a token should be granted for reaching only access to necessary resources.
4.4 List of evaluation criteria
The list of evaluation criteria for the AccessController module is the following:
1. Does the module support both the login first and application first scenarios?
2. Does the module provide a single sign off service or at least a logout service?
3. Is the interaction between the client and the authorization server or resource
server secured?
4. Does the module require a masterpassword for accessing credentials?
5. Does the module provide an option to use a key file instead of a master pass-
word or combine the key file and password methods?
6. Can a multi-factor authentication, for example a combination of a master
password and one time passwords, be used?
7. Can the keyring file be accessed from any device?
8. Does the end-user have control over where the credentials are stored?
9. Does the module has a centralized management which includes, for example,
user provisioning and usage monitoring?
10. Can the scope and expiring time of an access token be changed after the token
is obtained from the authorization server?
11. Does the scope include only the minimum access for resource servers?
AccessController will be evaluated according this list in section 7.2.
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5. ACCESSCONTROLLER
AccessController package can be used as a module for helping to retrieve data,
especially Linked Data, from open or closed online resource server, or from a local
file system. Regardless of the type of the resource’s location, data is retrieved with
a single method; ‘getData’.
5.1 Interface
The methods of the AccessController interface are presented in the listing 5.1. The
’getData’ method is for retrieving data from all kind of resource servers and locations;
servers protected with HTTP Basic Authentication or OAuth 2.0, servers providing
open data and local file systems. This method takes a username and the URI of a
resource as its parameters.
The ’openKeyRing’ method grants access to a keyring file which includes user-
names and passwords for resource servers. By providing a username and the URI of
a resource server as parameters for the ’revokeAccess’ method a user can revoke the
access of the username for the server. The method removes a password or refresh
token from a keyring file and revokes the refresh token if the method was called for
revoking a token.
package accessController;
import java.io.FileNotFoundException;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.net.MalformedURLException;
import java.net.URISyntaxException;
import java.util.List;
import com.google.api.client.auth.oauth2.Credential;
public interface AccessController {
void openKeyRing(String masterPassword ,
String fileName)
throws IOException;
String getData(String username , String fileUrl)
throws IOException , URISyntaxException;
boolean revokeAccess(String username ,
String server)
throws FileNotFoundException ,
IOException , URISyntaxException;
String getBasicAuthProtectedData(String username ,
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String fileUrl)
throws MalformedURLException , IOException;
String getOAuth2ProtectedData(String username ,
String fileUrl)
throws IOException;
String getLocalData(String filePath)
throws FileNotFoundException , IOException;
String getOpenData(String url)
throws IOException , URISyntaxException;
String getAccessToken(String username ,
String service)
throws IOException;
String getDataWithAccessToken(String fileURI ,
String accessToken)
throws IOException;
void revokeToken(String token , String service)
throws IOException , URISyntaxException;
}
Listing 5.1: AccessController interface
At the moment, the interface is implemented by the Access class which is pre-
sented in the following sections of this chapter.
5.2 Class structure
The class structure of AccessController is presented in the figure 5.1. The Ac-
cess class implements the AccessController interface. The Access class uses four
helper classes for retrieving data; BasicAuthHelper for HTTP Basic Authentication
protected resources; OAuth2Helper for OAuth 2.0 protected resources; OpenData-
Helper for open data resources; and LocalDataHelper for data in local file systems.
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Figure 5.1: Class structure of AccessController.
The Access class needs the KeyRingHelper class to open an access to a keyring
file. The KeyRingHelper class, for its part, uses the KeyRing class.
5.3 KeyRing class
Keyring files are accessed via a KeyRing object. The KeyRing class is a renamed
version of KeyChain.java; a Java class developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc. The
class allows storing multiple credentials or passwords in a central password store.
Access to this central store is controlled through a master password. A keyring entry
includes a username, server and password. The class uses the KeyStore class of Java’s
security package to store credentials and encrypt them with SHA-1 algorithm. The
actual store for the KeyStore class can be any OutputStream object and in the case
of AccessController the store is a FileOutputStream object. [6]
5.4 Retrieving data
The listing 5.2 shows the procedure of resolving the type of the authorization of the
resource server. The resolvation is done by the Access class.
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@Override
public String getData(String username , String fileURI)
throws IOException , URISyntaxException
{
if (OAuth2Helper.isOAuth2Protected(fileURI ))
{
return getOAuth2ProtectedData(username ,fileURI );
}
else if (BasicAuthHelper.isBasicAuthProtected(fileURI ))
{
return getBasicAuthProtectedData(
username , fileURI );
}
else if (fileURI.contains ("http ://"))
{
return getOpenData(fileURI );
}
else
{
return getLocalData(fileURI );
}
}
Listing 5.2: Resolving the authorization technology of the reource server
If an OAuth 2.0 protected resource is requested, the authorization server of the
resource server is resolved in the OAuth2Helper class as shown in listing 5.3.
public static String getFile(String username ,
String fileURI , KeyRing keyRing ,
String keyRingFile) throws IOException
{
List <String > scopeAndAuthServer =
getScopeAndAuthServer(fileURI );
String scope = scopeAndAuthServer.get (0);
String authServer = scopeAndAuthServer.get (1);
if (authServer.equals(GOOGLE_AUTHSERVER ))
{
return GoogleHelper.
getFile(username , fileURI ,
Arrays.asList(scope), authServer ,
REDIRECT_URI , CLIENT_ID ,
CLIENT_SECRET , keyRing , keyRingFile );
}
else
{
}
return null;
}
Listing 5.3: Resolving the authorization server
In case the authorization server belongs to Google, the service where the resource
locates, is resolved as described in listing 5.4. After that the resource is retrieved
from the specific service with a Credential object which includes an access token.
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Credential credential = getCredential(username ,
scopes , authServer , redirectURI , clientId ,
clientSecret , keyRing , keyRingFile );
if (scopes.get (0).
equals(OAuth2Helper.DRIVE_SCOPE ))
{
return getDriveFile(credential , fileURI );
}
else if (scopes.get (0).
equals(OAuth2Helper.MAPS_SCOPE ))
{
return getMap(credential , fileURI );
}
else
{
}
Listing 5.4: Resolving the requested Google service
If the request resource is protected with HTTP Basic Authentication then the
getFile method of the BasicAuthHelper class is called. The method Base64 encodes
the username and password, uses the encoded string as a property when opening a
connection to the server and gets an input stream from the URLConnection object.
The encoding and getting the input stream are presented in the listing 5.5. Finally
the input stream is transformed into a String object and returned to the Access
class.
String userPassword = username + ":" + password;
String encoding = Base64.encode(userPassword.getBytes ());
URLConnection uc = url.openConnection ();
uc.setRequestProperty (" Authorization", "Basic " + encoding );
InputStream is = null;
try
{
is = uc.getInputStream ();
}
Listing 5.5: Opening a connection to a resource server protected with HTTP Basic Au-
thentication
If the getData method of the Access class resolves that the requested resource is
open data, then the getData method of the OpenDataHelper class is called. The
method is presented in listing 5.6. In the method the URI object is constructed
from the protocol, path, query and other parts of the URL object. Then the URI
object is transformed into a URL object. The input stream of the URL object is
opened. The return value of the method is a String object which is transformed
from the stream.
public static String getData(String fileUrl)
throws IOException , URISyntaxException
{
URL url = new URL(fileUrl );
5. AccessController 19
URI uri = new URI(url.getProtocol (), url.getUserInfo (),
url.getHost(), url.getPort(), url.getPath(),
url.getQuery(), url.getRef ());
url = uri.toURL ();
return GeneralHelper.
readInputStreamAsString(url.openStream ());
}
Listing 5.6: GetData method of the OpenDataHelper class
Finally, if the URI of the resource did not match to any of the previous conditions
the resource is resolved to be in the local file system and the getData method of the
LocalDataHelper class, which is stated in listing 5.7, is called. In the method the
requested file is read to a FileInputStream object. Then the stream is transformed
into a String object which is returned to the Access class.
public static String getData(String filePath) throws IOException
{
FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(filePath );
return GeneralHelper.readInputStreamAsString(fis);
}
Listing 5.7: GetData method of the LocalDataHelper class
An access to a new type of resource location could be added by creating a new
condition in the getData method of the Access class and implementing a helper class
for this new access type. The helper class must have a method which returns the
requested data as a String object.
5.5 Obtaining credentials for OAuth 2.0
In case where there are no credentials in the keyring file for the OAuth 2.0 protected
resource server, in which the resource requested in the call of the ‘getData’ method
exists, the helper class of the requested service will obtain new credentials (figure
5.2).
The helper class tries to retrieve a refresh token by calling the ‘getPassword’
method of the KeyRing class but because the credentials do not exist the method
returns value ‘null’. The helper class resolves the URL of the authorization server
and calls the ‘authorizationCommandLineUI’ method of the OAuth2Helper class
for retrieving the authorization code from the user. The helper class exchanges the
code to an access token and a refresh token with the authorization server. Finally,
the helper class stores the refresh token in the keyring file. The procedure of the
GoogleHelper class for authorizing the user and exchanging the code is described in
the listing 5.8.
Instead of redirecting an authorization code from the authorization server to the
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client, AccessController asks the end-user to type the code for the client. This
approach is selected because directing the code to the client requires the device, on
which the client is launched, to act as web server. Therefore, the redirect URI is set
to ’ urn:ietf:wg:oauth:2.0:oob’ instead of ’http://localhost’. [8]
Figure 5.2: Obtaining credentials for OAuth 2.0.
String authorizeUrl = new GoogleAuthorizationCodeRequestUrl(
authServer ,clientId ,redirectURI ,scopes ). setState (""). build ();
String authorizationCode = OAuth2Helper.
authorizationCommandLineUI(authorizeUrl );
credential = exchangeCode(authorizationCode , clientId ,
clientSecret , scopes , redirectURI );
keyRing.addPassword(username , scopes.get(0),
credential.getRefreshToken (). toCharArray ());
keyRing.store(new FileOutputStream(keyRingFile ));
Listing 5.8: GoogleHelper’s procedure for authorization and the authorization code ex-
changing
Because obtaining credentials is implemented with Google’s own libraries, ob-
taining OAuth 2.0 credentials for another service provider requires creating a new
helper class. The new helper class uses the OAuth2Helper class and the helper class
is called in OAuth2Helper’s getData method.
5.6 Obtaining credentials for HTTP Basic Authentication
If BasicOAuthHelper gets a value of ’null’ when calling KeyRing’s ’getPassword’
method, then it asks the user for the password for the combination of the username
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and folder on the HTTP server (figure 5.3). BasicAuthHelper stores the combination
of username, password and folder in the keyring file for the future use.
Figure 5.3: Obtaining credentials for HTTP Basic Authentication.
5.7 Access revocation
From the perspective of a client application, the AccessController module’s access
revocation works analogically for both OAuth 2.0 and HTTP Basic Authentication
protected resource servers. An access is revoked by calling the ‘revokeAccess’ method
with the username and server as its parameters.
Listing 5.9 presents the method of the Access class for the access revocation. If the
server, to which the access is revoked, is protected with HTTP Basic Authentication
then the method only deletes the specific entry in the keyring file. In case of an
OAuth 2.0 protected server, the specific refresh token is first revoked by sending a
HTTP request to the revocation end-point of the authorization server. After the
token revocation the keyring entry is deleted.
@Override
public boolean revokeAccess(String username , String server)
throws FileNotFoundException ,
IOException , URISyntaxException
{
if (OAuth2Helper.isOAuth2Protected(server ))
{
String scope = OAuth2Helper.
getScopeAndAuthServer(server ).get (0);
String token = keyRing_.
getPassword(username , scope);
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if (OAuth2Helper.getScopeAndAuthServer(server ).
get (1). equals(
OAuth2Helper.GOOGLE_AUTHSERVER ))
{
String url = OAuth2Helper.GOOGLE_REVOKE +
token;
getOpenData(url);
keyRing_.removePassword(username , scope);
keyRing_.store(
new FileOutputStream(keyRingFile_ ));
return true;
}
else
{
return false;
}
}
else if (BasicAuthHelper.isBasicAuthProtected(server ))
{
keyRing_.removePassword(username , server );
keyRing_.store(
new FileOutputStream(keyRingFile_ ));
return true;
}
return false;
}
Listing 5.9: Access revocation
Contrary to the specification of OAuth 2.0, the token revocation of Google does
not require sending also client credentials beside the token to be revoked. This means
that the revoker of the token does not prove its identity and therefore a malicious
third party can revoke the token.
5.8 Granting access for untrusted applications
The AccessController module has a feature for granting a temporary access for
untrusted third-party applications. The granting happens by calling the ‘getAc-
cessToken’ method with parameters ‘username’ and ‘service’. The OAuth2Helper
class resolves the authorization server from the ’service’ parameter and calls the
concerned helper class (listing 5.10).
public static String getAccessToken(String username ,
String service , KeyRing keyRing , String keyRingFile)
throws IOException
{
String scope = OAuth2Helper.
getScopeAndAuthServer(service ).get (0);
List <String > scopes = Arrays.asList(scope );
String authServer = OAuth2Helper.
getScopeAndAuthServer(service ).get (1);
if (authServer.equals(
OAuth2Helper.GOOGLE_AUTHSERVER ))
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{
return GoogleHelper.getAccessToken(username ,
scopes , authServer , REDIRECT_URI , CLIENT_ID ,
CLIENT_SECRET , keyRing , keyRingFile );
}
else
{
return null;
}
}
Listing 5.10: The method for retrieving an access token
If there is a keyring entry for the username-service pair the ’getAccessToken’
method retrieves an access token by sending the refresh token to the authorization
server. Finally, the method returns the access token as Java String object. In
case where there is no keyring entry the method asks the end-user to authorize
himself/herself on the authorization server and then exchanges the authorization
code for refresh and access tokens. The method stores the refresh token in the
keyring file and returns the access token as a Java String object. Listing 5.11 shows
the method for retrieving an access token for a Google service.
For an untrusted third-party application to retrieve data from OAuth 2.0 pro-
tected server there is the ‘getDataWithAccessToken’ method which takes the URI
of data and an access token as its parameters. The owner of the access token can
revoke the access by calling the ‘revokeToken’ method with the access token as the
parameter, or revoking the refresh token with the ‘revokeAccess’ method.
public static String getAccessToken(String username ,
List <String > scopes , String authServer ,
String redirectURI , String clientId ,
String clientSecret , KeyRing keyRing ,
String keyRingFile)
throws IOException
{
Credential credential = getCredential(username , scopes ,
authServer , redirectURI , clientId ,
clientSecret , keyRing , keyRingFile );
return credential.getAccessToken ();
}
Listing 5.11: The method for retrieving an access token for a Google service
At the moment, AccessController can retrieve access tokens only for Google’s
services. Granting access tokens of another service provider is implemented by
adding a getAccessToken method in the helper class the service. The method simply
uses the credential retrieval method of the class and returns the access token.
5.9 Exceptions and recovering
Every method of the AccessController interface throws one or two exceptions. The
‘openKeyRing’ method, for example, throws an IOException if the keyring file could
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not be created or read. The exceptions of the ‘getData’ method are thrown by the
specific methods (getBasicAuthProtectedData’, getOAuth2ProtectedData’, getLo-
calData’ and ‘getOpenData’) which ‘getData’ calls, and therefore those exceptions
are covered in the following paragraphs which describe the exceptions of these spe-
cific methods.
The ‘getBasicAuthProtectedData’ method throws a MalformedURLException if
the URL of the folder is malformed. The method throws an IOException if a con-
nection to the URL cannot be opened, reading the user’s input fails or storing the
password in the keyring file fails. In case where the stored password or the password
typed by the user is wrong, the method catches an IOException, deletes the stored
password (if any) and calls the method itself what makes the method to ask the user
for a new password.
The ‘getOAuth2ProtectedData’ method throws an IOException if the data or
credential could not be obtained, the authorization code could not be exchanged for
tokens or storing the password in the keyring file fails. If the refresh token in the
keyring is revoked the method catches an IOException, deletes the refresh token in
the keyring and starts an authorization flow.
The ‘getLocalData’ method throws a FileNotFoundException in case the file the
client application requested was not found. A IOException is thrown by the method
if the file could not be read.
The ‘getOpenData’ method throws a URISyntaxException if the syntax of the
requested file’s URI was not correct. The method throws an IOException if the
connection to the URL of the file failed.
The methods ‘revokeAccess’ and ‘revokeToken’ throw an IOException in case they
received no response from the revocation end-point. They also throw a URISyntax-
Exception because they call the ‘getOpenData’ method.
The ‘getAccessToken’ method throws an IOException if the authorization code
could not be exchanged for tokens.
The ‘getDataWithAccessToken’ method throws an IOException if the data could
not be obtained.
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6. CASE STUDIES
This chapter depicts the applications which were developed for testing the function-
ality of the AccessController module. Soil Sample Mapper is an example case of
using AccessController in a trusted application. In section 6.2 there is described
how the module can be used for granting access for untrusted applications. The last
section of the chapter presents AccessControllerTask which is an Apache Ant task
for access controlling and retrieving data.
6.1 Soil Sample Mapper
Soil Sample Mapper (SSM) is an application for visualizing soil sample data on maps
of Google Maps service. The application was developed exclusively for testing the
functionality of the AccessController module and it is not intended to be used in
actual researches. SSM uses the AccessController module to retrieve XML files soil
sample data and maps from different resource servers.
In the example use case SSM produces maps from two researches. The data of
the other research, research1.xml, is located in Google Drive service and the data of
the other research, research2.xml in a HTTP server’s folder which is protected with
HTTP Basic Authentication. SSM also includes information about the soil texture
of samples. The information is retrieved from the site www.dbpedia.org which is an
open data source. Google Maps and Google Drive are protected with OAuth 2.0.
The function of SSM is demonstrated in the figure 6.1.
For the example use case, a Google account, with username ’soilsamplemapper’,
was created. In addition, a new user with username ’SSM’ was created in the HTTP
server. In the example use case there are no credentials for either Google’s services
or HTTP Basic Authentication stored in the keyring file.
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Figure 6.1: The function of Soil Sample Mapper
SSM retrieves its soil sample data from Google Drive and a HTTP Basic Authen-
tication protected server. However, AccessController provides options to get the
data also from the local file system or an open online site. These types of resource
locations were not selected to implement into SSM because they do not offer any
new testing value and SSM is supposed to be a brief application.
6.1.1 Structure of the data transmission
Figure 6.2 depicts the parties of SSM’s data transmission and figure 6.3 details the
phases of the transmission. Listing 6.1 shows the program code of Soil Sample
Mapper.
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Figure 6.2: The parties involved in SSM’s data transmission.
First SSM opens an access to the keyring file by calling the ‘openKeyRing’ method
of AccessController. SSM requests for the ‘research1.xml’ file in Google Drive with
the method call ‘getData(‘’soilsamplemapper”, ‘’GoogleDrive/file=research1.xml”)’
where the first parameter is the username of the Google account and the second the
URI of the data. AccessController resolves from the URI that the requested data is in
Drive service and therefore tries to retrieve a refresh token from the keyring file with
the method call ‘getPassword(‘’soilsamplemapper”, GoogleDriveScope)’. Because
there is no refresh token stored AccessController asks the end-user to authorize
himself/herself on the Google’s authorization server.
After a successful login the user types the authorization code and AccessController
exchanges the code for a refresh token and access token. Then AccessController
retrieves the file, stores the refresh token in the keyring file and returns the file to
SSM.
Next SSM requests AccessController for the map file by making the method call
‘getData(‘’soilsamplemapper”, ‘’GoogleMaps/map=research1”)’. Again, there is no
refresh token and AccessController retrieves and stores tokens in an identical way
as in the case of Drive. The XML data of the ‘research1’ map is returned to SSM.
AccessController ac = new Access ();
ac.openKeyRing (" masterPassword", "keyRing.txt");
String research1Data = ac.getData (" soilsamplemapper",
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"GoogleDrive/file=research1.xml");
String map = ac.getData (" soilsamplemapper",
"GoogleMaps/map=research1 ");
MapMaker.makeMap(map , research1Data , "research1Map.kml", ac);
String research2Data = ac.getData ("test",
"http :// www.cs.tut.fi/~ mustonep/SoilSampleMapper/research2.xml");
String map2 = ac.getData (" soilsamplemapper",
"GoogleMaps/map=research2 ");
MapMaker.makeMap(map2 , research2Data , "research2Map.kml", ac);
Listing 6.1: SoilSampleMapper class
In the next phase SSM retrieves information about the soil texture (e.g. silt or
loam) of the samples. This is done incrementally in a loop for each sample. The data
for a sample is retrieved with the method call ‘getData(null,URLForSoilTexture)’
where the value of the username parameter is ‘null’ because is no authentication
in DBPedia.org’s server. The URI parameter includes the URL of DBPedia.org’s
server and a SPARQL query for data of a soil texture. AccessController retrieves the
soil texture data and returns the data to SSM. This phase is done in the MapMaker
class. Listing 6.2 is a sample code from the MapMaker class and it shows how the
textures are retrieved.
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Document research = DocumentHelper.parseText(researchData );
List <Element > textureElements = research.selectNodes ("// texture ");
List <String > textureInfos = new ArrayList <String >();
for (Element textureElement : textureElements)
{
String texture = textureElement.getStringValue ();
String query1 = "SELECT ?abstract " +
"WHERE { " +
"{ <http :// dbpedia.org/resource /" +
texture + "> " +
"<http :// dbpedia.org/ontology/abstract > ?abstract . " +
"FILTER langMatches( lang(? abstract), ’en ’) }" +
"}";
String URI = "http :// dbpedia.org/sparql ?" +
"default -graph -uri=http :// dbpedia.org" +
"& format=application/rdf+xml"+ "&query =" +
query1 + "& timeout =0& debug=on";
Document textureDoc = DocumentHelper.parseText(
ac.getData(null , URI));
String textureInfo = textureDoc.
selectSingleNode ("// sparql ").
getStringValue ();
textureInfos.add(textureInfo );
}
Listing 6.2: Getting information about soil textures
In the final phase of creating a ‘Soil Sample Map’ Soil Sample Mapper adds the
data of soil samples (from research1.xml) and information about soil textures (from
DBPedia.org) into the placemark elements of the ‘research1’ map. The result map
is stored in the local file system.
In the example use case the second file of soil sample data is stored in the folder
of HTTP server and the folder is protected with HTTP Basic Authentication. SSM
calls AccessController’s ‘getData’ method with the username parameter ‘SSM’ and
the URI parameter which is a HTTP URL to the file in the folder of the HTTP
server. AccessController resolvers that the folder is Basic Authentication protected
and tries to get a password from the keyring file. Because there is no password
stored AccessController asks the user to type the password. If the password was
correct AccessController retrieves the ‘research2.xml’ file, stores the password and
returns the file to SSM.
Next, SSM requests for the second map in the same way as with the first map.
This time, however, there is already a refresh token for Google Maps stored in
the keyring file, and hence no authorization is needed. AccessController obtains an
access token by sending the refresh token to the authorization server. The ‘research2’
is retrieved and returned to SSM by AccessController.
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The process of retrieving information about soil textures and creating ‘Soil Sample
Maps’ is identical with the first research (research1).
Figure 6.3: Phases of data transmission between SSM, servers on the Internet and the local
file system.
More soil sample data and maps could be processed in the same application. If
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the soil sample data is retrieved from the same Google Drive account, in this case
from the account of user soilsamplemapper, the refresh token in the keyring will be
used and no authorization is needed. This same situation concerns also retrieving
maps from Google Maps service.
6.1.2 Technology stack
The figure 6.4 shows the technology stack of Soil Sample Mapper application. SSM
retrieves data from resource servers with the AccessController module. SSM pro-
cesses XML data with the Document and Element classes of Dom4j package. The
FileWriter and File classes are used for writing the result maps in the local file sys-
tem. Keyring files are stored in the local file system. AccessController uses HTTPS
or HTTP as its connection protocol.
Figure 6.4: Technology stack of Soil Sample Mapper.
6.1.3 Tool and device environment
The IDE used in the development of the application was Eclipse Classic 4.2.1, release
Juno (4.2) SR1. The version of Java Development Kit was 7 Update 11 for Win-
dows x64. The application was developed on Windows 7 Home Premium (64-bit)
operation system.
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6.2 Untrusted application
AccessController’s feature of granting access tokens was tested by creating an ap-
plication which is created (or run) by the owner of the resources and grants access
tokens, and an ”untrusted” application which uses the granted tokens. In other
words, the feature can be used in case where the owner of the resources does not
want share his/her key ring file and/or login credentials with the untrusted applica-
tion. Instead of sharing that information, the owner grants a temporary access by
giving access tokens to the untrusted application.
The granting application obtains the access tokens by calling the getAccessToken
method of AccessController as described in listing 6.3. The owner can define to
which service (specified by the scope of token) the token grants access to. The
owner is not able to decide the expiring time of tokens but that depends on the
configuration of the authorization server.
AccessController owner = new Access ();
owner.openKeyRing (" keyRing.txt", "masterPassword ");
String tokenDrive = owner.getAccessToken (" soilsamplemapper", "GoogleDrive ");
String tokenMaps = owner.getAccessToken (" soilsamplemapper", "GoogleMaps ");
Listing 6.3: The application that grants the access tokens
Listing 6.4 shows how an untrusted application can use AccessController’s get-
DataWithAccessToken method for retrieving data with access tokens. The applica-
tion can retrieve unlimited amount of data during the life-time of the token.
AccessController ac = new Access ();
String tokenDrive = "ya29.AHES6ZQJSU3M0MDE0 -p5s38 -S5Mr9NuGbEfzs2__o1YpLhM ";
String tokenMaps = "ya29.AHES6ZQv79sjLLmEBzLx98L4503NO4SOEkFrrCf0FOAQ_7A ";
String data = ac.getDataWithAccessToken (" GoogleDrive/file=research1.xml", tokenDrive );
String map = ac.getDataWithAccessToken (" GoogleMaps/map=research1", tokenMaps );
Listing 6.4: An untrusted application which uses access tokens for retrieving data
After granting the access tokens the owner can revoke the tokens with AccessCon-
troller’s revokeToken method. In the case of listing 6.3, the owner could make a call
’owner.revokeToken(”ya29.AHES6ZQJSU3M0MDE0-p5s38-S5Mr9NuGbEfzs2__
o1YpLhM”)’. However, neither the AccessController module nor the authorization
server cannot provide a feature to observe if the untrusted has already used the
token.
Neither using access tokens nor revoking them requires any client identification.
Therefore, a malicious third-party application or user, which has hijacked an access
token, can retrieve data with the token or revoke it.
6.3 Apache Ant task
An Apache Ant task, called AccessControllerTask, makes it possible to use the
AccessController module in Ant pipelines. The task was packed to a jar archive
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with Eclipse’s Fat Jar Plug-In. In addition to the Java file, the archive also includes
the jar archives of the AccessController module and ant library’s version 1.7.1.
6.3.1 Example pipeline
Listing 6.5 illustrates an example pipeline of using AccessControllerTask. In the
first target’s taskdef task the name of the task is defined to be accessController. In
the second target the defined task is used to retrieve data. The input tasks asks
the user for the name and master password of the keyring file. The next element,
accessController, includes four inner elements, called accessResource. The first inner
element retrieves open data and therefore it does not have a username attribute. The
retrieved data is stored into the location specified in the outputfile attribute. The
second inner element gets data from a server protected with HTTP Basic Basic
Authentication. The user is asked for a password for the server if the password
does not exist in the keyring file. The next two elements retrieve data from servers
protected with OAuth 2.0. If there is no access tokens for the servers in the keyring
file the user is prompted to authorize himself/herself in the authorization server.
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="ISO -8859 -1"? >
<project name=" acTest" basedir ="." default =" access">
<target name=" definition" description =" Define AccessControllerTask" >
<taskdef name=" accessController"
classname =" AccessControllerTask"
classpath =" accessControllerTask.jar"/>
</target >
<target name=" access" description =" Access some resources"
depends =" definition">
<input
message =" Please enter the name of the keyring file:"
addproperty =" keyring"
/>
<input
message =" Please enter the master password for the keyring file:"
addproperty =" masterpassword"
>
<handler
classname ="org.apache.tools.ant.input.SecureInputHandler" />
</input >
<accessController keyRingFile ="${keyring }"
masterPassword ="${masterpassword }">
<accessResource resourceURI ="http :// dbpedia.org/data/Silt"
outputFile ="test1.xml"/>
<accessResource username ="SSM"
resourceURI=
"http :// www.cs.tut.fi/~ mustonep/SoilSampleMapper/research2.xml"
outputFile ="test2.xml" />
<accessResource username =" soilsamplemapper"
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resourceURI =" GoogleMaps/map=research1"
outputFile ="test3.xml" />
<accessResource username =" soilsamplemapper"
resourceURI =" GoogleDrive/file=research1.xml"
outputFile ="test4.xml" />
</accessController >
</target >
</project >
Listing 6.5: Example of using AccessControllerTask
As using AccessController in a Java application, also in an Ant pipeline Access-
Controller uses passwords or refresh tokens in the keyring for retrieving data from
servers from which there was previously retrieved data. Naturally, the keyring file
is opened for the particular task and it cannot be accessed in other tasks without
entering a valid master password.
6.3.2 Java class of the Ant task
A Java class, called AccessControllerTask.java, implements the Apache Ant task.
When an AccessControllerTask is executed in a pipeline, the processor calls the
execute method of the class. At the beginning of the method if the user entered the
name and master password of the keyring file, the keyring file is opened by calling the
openKeyRing method of AccessController. The inner accessResource elements are
processed in a loop which is presented in listing 6.6. If the value of the revokeAccess
attribute of AccessControllerTask element is true then every access is revoked in a
loop.
for(Iterator <AccessResource > it=accesses_.iterator (); it.hasNext ();)
{
AccessResource access = (AccessResource)it.next ();
String username = access.getUsername ();
String URI = access.getResourceURI ();
String token = access.getAccessToken ();
try
{
String data = null;
PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(access.getOutputFile ());
if ((token == null || token == "") && URI != null && URI != "")
{
data = ac_.getData(username , URI);
}
else if (URI != null && URI != "")
{
ac_.getDataWithAccessToken(URI , token);
}
else
{
out.close ();
throw new BuildException ("URI is a required attribute ");
}
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out.write(data);
out.close ();
log(" Retrieved the resource " + URI);
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace ();
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
e.printStackTrace ();
}
}
Listing 6.6: The loop which processes the inner elements
The inner elements are implemented as a public class called AccessResource.
When an inner element is processed, a new instance of the class is created by calling
the createAccessResource method (stated in listing 6.7) of the AccessControllerTask
class. In the method the new instance is added to accesses_ list.
public AccessResource createAccessResource ()
{
AccessResource access = new AccessResource ();
accesses_.add(access );
return access;
}
Listing 6.7: The method for creating an instance of AccessResource
New inner elements can be created by adding a new class inside the AccessCon-
trollerTask class and implementing a ‘create’ method, such as createAccessResource.
New attributes for accessControllerTask element or inner elements can be imple-
mented by adding a private variable (e.g. String username_) and the setter and
getter methods (e.g. setUsername and getUsername) for the private variable.
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7. ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the results of the thesis and summarizes the methods applied
to obtain these results.
7.1 Methods
Two different methods were used to evaluate the AccessController module; the case
studies and the evaluation framework and criteria. The case studies covered using
AccessController in a trusted application in which the user trusts his/her refresh
tokens and passwords for storing, untrusted application which uses access tokens
granted by the owner of the resource for retrieving, and Apache Ant task. The
evaluation framework and criteria were mainly constructed from reviews of SSO
systems and password managers.
7.2 Results
This chapter answers to the evaluation criteria presented in the list in the section
4.4. The criteria are referred in parentheses, i.e. ”(criterion 6)”.
The most significant result of this thesis is that the access to several protected
resources can be controlled with the following exceptions. Firstly, the access restric-
tions to the resource or an end-user’s password for either an OAuth 2.0 or HTTP
Basic Authentication protected server cannot be controlled via the client program or
the AccessController module. Secondly, an access to OAuth 2.0 protected resource
cannot be granted for a scope under authorization server which is different than the
server user logged in.
AccessController offers an almost analogical access to the resource regardless
whether the resource server is protected with OAuth 2.0 or HTTP Basic Authenti-
cation, or the resource is open data. The only difference between OAuth resources
and the other kind of resources is that OAuth resources are unaccessible via HTTP
URLs while the other resources are accessed via URLs. This is because the URLs of
OAuth 2.0 protected resources include an identification code which cannot be used
by the end-user because of the matters of usability.
Passwords and refresh tokens are hashed with SHA-1 algorithm and stored in a
keyring file which is created with Java’s KeyStore class and secured with a master
password. An entry of a keyring file includes a username, password or refresh token,
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and a folder of a HTTP server or a scope of a OAuth 2.0 protected resource server.
7.2.1 SSO features
AccessController creates a new keyring entry for every new scope (or resource server)
of the particular user. Hence, the AccessController module grants only the mini-
mum access to the resources of the user. However, AccessController does not utilize
the single sign-on feature of an authorization server. On the other hand, Access-
Controller itself is a SSO system because the master password of a keyring file may
grant access to multiple servers.
The AccessController module supports the application first scenario of SSO sys-
tems: it first checks if there is a password or refresh token for the specific username
and server stored in the keyring file. If there is not then AccessController asks the
end-user to login into an OAuth 2.0 authorization server or enter a password for
HTTP Basic Authentication. The module does not offer an option to store creden-
tials into a keyring file before trying to access the resource. Therefore, the module
does not support the login first scenario. (criterion 1)
The AccessController module can logout a client application from both OAuth 2.0
and HTTP Basic Authentication protected resource servers. The logout method of
AccessController deletes the entry in the keyring file and in case of a refresh token it
also revokes the token. However, an end-user’s signing off on an authorization server
does not affect either the lifetime or validity of tokens. If the keyring file is deleted
or the master password lost a revocation by a portal of an authorization server is
the only way to revoke the refresh tokens. (criterion 2)
The situation where an end-user revokes a refresh token of a client application in
an online portal of an authorization server is also considered in the AccessController
module. The module detects a revoked token when retrieving data from the resource
server, and asks the end-user to login on the authorization server.
7.2.2 Password manager features
The AccessController module can be used as a local (desktop) password manager.
One of its benefits as a password manager is that an end-user can control where the
credentials are stored.
Credentials are secured with a master password (criterion 4) but there is no op-
tion to use a key file instead of a master password or combine the key file and
password methods (criterion 5). If the master password (and encryption of the cre-
dentials) is strong enough the credentials stored with AccessController are secure.
Disadvantage of AccessController is that only passwords and tokens are encrypted
in a keyring file, and usernames, servers and scopes are unencrypted. Therefore,
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username-server/scope combinations are unsecured information. In addition, be-
cause AccessController works locally anyone who has access to the computer (ac-
tually to the folder of the keyring file) is also able to read the keyring file. But
because credentials are stored in a file the user has full control over the location of
the credential store (criterion 8).
There are also some other disadvantages of desktop password managers compared
to online managers: no credential synchronization between computer, accessiblity
from any computer (criterion 7), or one time passwords or any other multi-factor
authentication (criterion 6).
7.2.3 Other features
AccessController does not specify the type of connection between the client appli-
cation and the authorization server or resource server but it depends on servers
(criterion 3). However, the module supports both HTTP and HTTPS protocols.
The AccessController module stores only the scope of the resource server of the
requested resource into the keyring file. Therefore, the module provides minimum
access to resource servers (criterion 11).
AccessController has a feature by which an end-user can grant access tokens to
an untrusted third-party application. The owner of the access token can control the
access by either revoking the particular access token, or all the access tokens granted
by a refresh token by revoking the refresh token. A remarkable disadvantage of this
feature is that the owner cannot affect the lifetimes of the access tokens he/she grants
(criterion 10). Furthermore, the owner is not able to control, or even monitor, how
many times the third-party application access the resource with the access token.
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8. CONCLUSION
The main goal of this thesis was to investigate how access to resource servers can
be controlled in an application that utilizes both open and closed Linked Data.
The thesis also aimed at finding out a way to store and manage credentials for
resource servers. To answer the research question a module called AccessController
was developed.
The AccessController module meets the most relevant requirements set to the
module. It can be used in a trusted application for retrieving data and storing
credentials. The module is also able to grant access tokens for an untrusted appli-
cation and the untrusted application can use the module to retrieve data with these
access tokens. It was very straightforward to use AccessController as library when
implementing an Apache Ant task for access controlling.
The AccessController module supports only a few types of resource servers with
closed data. However, this support can be extended by creating new helper classes.
When creating a new helper class for a service which uses OAuth 2.0 for autho-
rization, the new helper class will be called in the OAuth2Helper class. To retrieve
data from a resource server protected with some other authorizarion technique, a
completely new helper class must be created. A new Google service could be added
into the GoogleHelper class and it could use GoogleHelper’s method for obtaining
credentials.
The most significant feature which AccessController is lacking, is controlling the
expiring time of access tokens. However, this is caused by the functionality of OAuth
2.0. The feature can be implemented into AccessController when there is a suitable
authorization technique available.
A possible solution to control the lifetimes of granted access tokens with the
current version of OAuth 2.0, is a process which revokes the token after the time
period decided by the granter of the token.
On the whole, the AccessController module responded well to the needs of this
thesis and it can be further developed by adding new features.
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